The MS. hie tunc of V. 6 has no friends. L. Mueller's hoc tunc is weak and flat, and L. Rank, Mnemosyne 40. 51, is justly dissatisfied with the hietans of M. Havet's larger and smaller editions, to which the hians of Verg. Aen. 12. 754 lends no sufficient support, as there the dog is opening its mouth before it bites. Add to this that it is by no means certain that Phaedrus would either have used the word or used (...) it in the simple sense of opening the mouth. Rank's own proposal, ‘heu’ tunc, fails also to carry conviction. There is however a word which belongs to our author's vocabulary and is as near to the manuscripts as either of the above, and which hits the sense at which hietans aims. This is rictus. The word is often used of the opened mouths of dogs, Lucr. 5. 1064, Ovid Met. 13. 568. Juvenal 10. 271 sq. ‘canino latrauit rictu,’ and of other animals. That it is appropriate with dimisit ‘let go’ may be seen from the counterpart expression of Martial 1. 48. 1 ‘rictibus his tauros non eripuere magistri.’. (shrink)

The MS. hie tunc of V. 6 has no friends. L. Mueller's hoc tunc is weak and flat, and L. Rank, Mnemosyne 40. 51, is justly dissatisfied with the hietans of M. Havet's larger and smaller editions, to which the hians of Verg. Aen. 12. 754 lends no sufficient support, as there the dog is opening its mouth before it bites. Add to this that it is by no means certain that Phaedrus would either have used the word or used (...) it in the simple sense of opening the mouth. Rank's own proposal, ‘heu’ tunc, fails also to carry conviction. There is however a word which belongs to our author's vocabulary and is as near to the manuscripts as either of the above, and which hits the sense at which hietans aims. This is rictus. The word is often used of the opened mouths of dogs, Lucr. 5. 1064, Ovid Met. 13. 568. Juvenal 10. 271 sq. ‘canino latrauit rictu,’ and of other animals. That it is appropriate with dimisit ‘let go’ may be seen from the counterpart expression of Martial 1. 48. 1 ‘rictibus his tauros non eripuere magistri.’. (shrink)

Background Regarding controversial medical services, many have argued that if physicians cannot in good conscience provide a legal medical intervention for which a patient is a candidate, they should refer the requesting patient to an accommodating provider. This study examines what US physicians think a doctor is obligated to do when the doctor thinks it would be immoral to provide a referral. Method The authors conducted a cross-sectional survey of a random sample of 2000 US physicians from all specialties. The (...) primary criterion variable was agreement that physicians have a professional obligation to refer patients for all legal medical services for which the patients are candidates, even if the physician believes that such a referral is immoral. Results Of 1895 eligible physicians, 1032 (55%) responded. 57% of physicians agreed that doctors must refer patients regardless of whether or not the doctor believes the referral itself is immoral. Holding this opinion was independently associated with being more theologically pluralistic, describing oneself as sociopolitically liberal, and indicating that respect for patient autonomy is the most important bioethical principle in one's practice (multivariable ORs, 1.6–2.4). Conclusions Physicians are divided about a professional obligation to refer when the physician believes that referral itself is immoral. These data suggest there is no uncontroversial way to resolve conflicts posed when patients request interventions that their physicians cannot in good conscience provide. (shrink)

© Ginn et al. 2016.The indexing methods currently used for serial femtosecond crystallography were originally developed for experiments in which crystals are rotated in the X-ray beam, providing significant three-dimensional information. On the other hand, shots from both X-ray free-electron lasers and serial synchrotron crystallography experiments are still images, in which the few three-dimensional data available arise only from the curvature of the Ewald sphere. Traditional synchrotron crystallography methods are thus less well suited to still image data processing. Here, a (...) new indexing method is presented with the aim of maximizing information use from a still image given the known unit-cell dimensions and space group. Efficacy for cubic, hexagonal and orthorhombic space groups is shown, and for those showing some evidence of diffraction the indexing rate ranged from 90% to 151%. Here, the indexing rate refers to the number of lattices indexed per image. (shrink)

I advance a type of conceptualist argument for substance dualism – minimally, the view that we are spiritual substances that have bodies – based on the understandability of what it would be for something to be a spirit, e.g. what it would be for God to be a spirit. After presenting the argument formally, I clarify and defend its various premises with a special focus on what I take to be the most controversial one, namely, if thinking matter is metaphysically (...) possible, it is not the case that we have a distinct positive concept of God's being a divine spirit. (shrink)

There are two tasks for any adequate philosophy of mind: (1) articulate one’s position and explain why dualism is the commonsense view; (2) defend one’s position. I believe that there is an argument that simultaneously satisfies both desiderata in a non–ad hoc way and, thus, the argument can thereby claim the virtue of theoretical simplicity in its favor. In what follows, I shall present the argument and defend its most crucial premise, respond to three criticisms that have been raised against (...) it, and draw out one dialectical implication of the argument. (shrink)

The appearance of consciousness in the world is an amazing and puzzling fact in its own right. Indeed, consciousness is one of the most mystifying features of the cosmos. The unity of consciousness is something that cries out for analysis and explanation as well. This chapter provides a way of relating the three types of unity: objectual phenomenal unity; subject phenomenal unity; and subsumptive phenomenal unity. According to Tim Bayne and David Chalmers, this sort of unity is irrelevant for investigating (...) the nature of consciousness' unity because it is trivially true by definition and tells us nothing about consciousness. Many thinkers, including Bayne himself, believe there is no self or subject that unifies consciousness. Bayne's position amounts to a bunch of mere assertions that allow him to avoid an obvious solution: substance dualism. (shrink)

For some time now, Nancey Murphy has been a major voice on behalf of a certain form of Christian physicalism. This is a part of her project of reconciling science with Christian faith. In what follows, I shall state and criticize the three central components of her Christian physicalism, followed by a presentation of a dualist alternative along with a clarification of its advantages over Murphy-style physicalism.

While most philosophers agree that libertarian agency and naturalism are incompatible, few attempts have been offered to spell out in some detail just why this is the case. My purpose in this article is to fill this gap in the literature by expanding on and clarifying the connection between naturalism as it is widely understood today and the rejection of libertarian agency. To accomplish this end I begin by clarifying different forms of libertarian agency and identity the key philosophical components (...) that constitute libertarian agency per se. Second, three different aspects of contemporary scientific naturalism are analyzed and the relations among them clarified: the naturalist epistemic attitude, etiology, and ontology. This is followed by a presentation of six arguments for the claim that libertarian agency should be rejected by advocates of scientific naturalism. Finally, I criticize a recent attempt by Randolf Clarke to reconcile libertarian agency and scientific naturalism. (shrink)

1. Introduction . In the chapter which he devotes to the applications of his principle of individual liberty, Mill considers the question ‘how far liberty may legitimately be invaded for the prevention of crime, or of accident’. On the latter topic, he writes:—‘… it is a proper office of public authority to guard against accidents. If either a public officer or anyone else saw a person attempting to cross a bridge which had been ascertained to be unsafe, and there were (...) no time to warn him of his danger, they might seize him and turn him back, without any real infringement of his liberty; for liberty consists in doing what one desires, and he does not desire to fall into the river.”. (shrink)

Moral conflicts occur in theories that involve more than one principle. I examine basic ways of dealing with moral dilemmas in medical ethics and in ethics generally, and propose a different approach based on a principle I call the "mutuality principle". It is offered as an addition to Tom Beauchamp and James Childress' principlism. The principle calls for the mutual enhancement of basic moral values. After explaining the principle and its strengths, I test it by way of an examination of (...) three responses—in the recent Festschrift for Dr Raanon Gillon—to a case involving parental refusal of a blood transfusion. The strongest response is the one that comes closest to the requirements of the mutuality principle but yet falls short. I argue that the mutuality principle provides an explicit future orientation in principlism and gives it greater moral coherence. (shrink)

One of the most important features of living beings that seems universal is perhaps their ability to be modified in a functional way.In order to modelize this characteristic, we designed automata with a finite number of instantaneous internal descriptions, with input(s) and output(s) and which are able to be functionally modified.

I criticize the view that top-down causation is a proper model for depicting and justifying belief in mental causation. When properly interpreted, I believe that there are no clear examples of top-down causation, and there is a persuasive case against it. In order to defend these claims, I, first, clarify three preliminary considerations; second, undermine alleged examples of top-down causation; third, present a case for why there is no top-down mental causation; fourth, explain an important option for moving forward in (...) preserving what we all know to be the case—that mental causation is real. (shrink)

I present and clarify one form of the modal argument for substance dualism, and go on to state and provide defeaters for five of the major arguments raised against the modal argument as a whole. I do not provide an unabridged defence of the modal argument. Instead, I focus on a range of defeaters scattered throughout the literature that are raised against the modal argument. In my view, these have not been gathered in one place and freshly evaluated. Accordingly, my (...) limited purpose is to fill this lacuna. Thus, I present a representative version of the modal argument to set the context for what follows. Next, I clarify and critique the five major objections directed at the modal argument in general. (shrink)

Hume fully recognised, and partially explained, the role of inductions from single experiments in human knowledge - something his Scottish critics, and some more recent ones, failed to understand. Those inferences, he maintains, depend on the use of a Newtonian rule and the removal of superfluous circumstances. But that rule is not sufficient, and Hume never stated the exact conditions of this removal. We should distinguish between survey and experience in his philosophy, to understand how experience of conjunctions where inductive (...) knowledge has accumulated, in uniform or regular classes or sets of phenomena, may produce cognitive situations when once is enough - without relying on any mysterious innate principles. (shrink)

Hume fully recognised, and partially explained, the role of inductions from single experiments in human knowledge - something his Scottish critics, and some more recent ones, failed to understand. Those inferences, he maintains, depend on the use of a Newtonian rule and the removal of superfluous circumstances. But that rule is not sufficient, and Hume never stated the exact conditions of this removal. We should distinguish between survey and experience in his philosophy, to understand how experience of conjunctions where inductive (...) knowledge has accumulated, in uniform or regular classes or sets of phenomena, may produce cognitive situations when once is enough - without relying on any mysterious innate principles. (shrink)

Steve Cowan had criticized my defense of theistic science on four grounds: (1) my critique of compatibilism attacks a straw man; (2) libertarianism cannot meet some of the conditions for responsible action; (3) attributing libertarian agency to God has the unacceptable implication that God can do evil; and (4) we don’t need libertarianism to provide a model of divine actions sufficient to justify the scientific detectability of miracles. I clarify and respond to these points in the order listed and conclude (...) that Cowan’s critique fails. (shrink)

This article reflects on three issues: the past twenty years of the Evangelical Philosophical Society, ideas for EPS's future, and some words of advice to my younger EPS colleagues. Regarding, I identify four values that were central to the rebirth of the EPS and that have guided us for twenty years. Regarding, I issue a warning and a challenge. Regarding, I provide three words of advice for keeping us on course.

In a previous article, I argue that on the assumption that God exercises libertarian agency, a primary causal divine miracle could, in principle, leave a scientifically detectable gap in the natural world. In a subsequent publication, Evan Fales offered a critique of my argument and this article is my rejoinder. I justify my employment of Divine libertarian agency and respond to Fales’s two, closely-related questions: How much energy could one add to a room by making a lot of decisions? Would (...) the increase in energy be measurable? (shrink)

The progress in artificial intelligence enables us to conceive adaptive systems whose characteristics are nearer and nearer to those of living beings. These characteristics though depend on ingenious choices by the designer of these systems: Initial conditions, parameters, optimisation functions, gradient and measure of fitness within the environment. Nevertheless, in living systems which are non-finalist, there are no programmers or designers to conceive of such ingenious choices. Our paper “Self-Programming Machines (I)” presents a non-finalist model since initial states and functions (...) are randomly chosen at the beginning and once and for all. In spite of the fact that they are non-finalist, these machines always stabilise at fixed points when they are connected to an external process. (shrink)

The first comprehensive study of Nietzsche's earliest book, The Birth of Tragedy, this important volume by M. S. Silk and J. P. Stern examines the work in detail: its place in Nietzsche's philosophical career; its value as an account of ancient Greek culture; its place in the history of German ideas, and its value as a theory of tragedy and music. Presented in a fresh twenty-first-century series livery, and including a specially commissioned preface written by Lesley Chamberlain, illuminating its enduring (...) importance and relevance to philosophical enquiry, this accessible study has been revived for a new generation of readers. (shrink)

Among the multitude of commentators by which an Horatian crux is surrounded it is reasonable to suppose that one or two at least have seen some vestiges of the truth, and I will therefore preface my remarks upon the meaning of this ode and its ultimate stanza by quoting first from an annotation by Dean Wickham.

There are two undoubted instances of this use of Neaera in Prudentius which are cited by Mr. Ullman in support of his contention that in Horace another proper name may be similarly employed. I imagine however that to an unprejudiced sense of Latin usage these instances will themselves seem to be strange and in need of explanation.

Thus reads the ‘optimus Laurentianus,’ and starting hence we shall refuse claudent, the facile but incoherent correction of some MSS., and still more the claudunt which the majority offer. Nor for all that shall we make the ineptitude of these readings a ground for condemning the pentameter, which, save for its lack of grammatical construction, is perfectly faultless in expression. Turning our attention to the hexameter, we observe that Parca, a synonym for fata with trahebat will set everything right. The (...) offending fata is due to a gloss or an unfortunate reminiscence. (shrink)

The following notes are based on the apparatus criticus in the edition of E. T. Merrill : I. 20. 5 ‘uides ut statuas, signa, picturas, hominum denique multorumqne animalium formas, arborum etiam, si modo sint decorae, nihil magis quam amplitudo commendet.’ Why ‘many animals’ and not ‘many men’ and ‘many trees’? Read mutorum; with ‘animalia,’ a standing opposition to ‘homines,’ as in Seneca, Ep. 76. 26 'ea quae tam homini contingunt quam mutis animalibus, 'where also it has been corrupted to (...) multis as in many other places. (shrink)

Mr. Garrod has earned the gratitude of all students of Manilius by his detection of the ratio of the series in iii. 599–615, and he is fully justified in his contention that tricenas in 612 is ‘one of the few emendations which can be proved mathematically.’ I owe him a special acknowledgment, inasmuch as his discovery enables me to add one more to the list and affords me an opportunity of establishing what was correct and correcting what was erroneous in (...) my discussion of the whole passage in Silua Maniliana, pp. 30 sqq. Let me do the last first. My suggestion of uix for bis in 616 of course disappears; bis sex is required by the series: and in 595–6 the number meant is 75, not 76. (shrink)

Dissatisfied with current views upon the exordium of Tibullus II. i., I proposed in Selections from Tibullus to make the occasion of the poem the Sementiuae Feriae instead of the Ambarualia. This proposal, criticised, amongst others, by Mr. Warde Fowler in an interesting article in the Classical Review, I have now abandoned. But the difficulties which led me to break away from previous exegesis still remain, and to them I address myself in the present article.